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Preserving Hong Kong's Autonomy While
Facilitating Chinese Reform: The Potential Role
of Globalization in Guiding China's Governance
SHEBA MARY VATTAMATTAM*
The People's Republic of China's (PRC) first liberal constitutional
government was heralded in the Sino-British Joint Declaration, an international
treaty that guaranteed Hong Kong's autonomy upon its 1997 reversion)
Embarking on a new political structure, the Joint Declaration promised an
uneventful reunion between Hong Kong and China, in "guaranteeing" a one-
country, two-systems paradigm to preserve Hong Kong's capitalist economy,
democracy, rule of law, and other forms of liberal constitutional governance.2
However, great skepticism surrounds China's reassurances of a fully
democratic and free market Hong Kong within a greater socialist, semi-market
framework Although Hong Kong's government, comprised of Chinese
loyalists and Hong Kong's business elite, aspire to maintain a free-market in
Hong Kong, the Joint Declaration's guarantees of direct democratic elections,
free expression, and the rule of law have already eroded under Hong Kong's
current administration.'
An instinctive projection might be that Hong Kong's Basic Law
provisions5 will eventually be consumed by China's authoritarian regime. Yet,
* J.D. Candidate, 2000, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1992, Florida
State University. The author wishes to thank Bruce and her family for their continuous
encouragement and guidance, as well as Dean Alfred C. Aman, Jr. for his direction and assistance
in preparing this Note.
I. See Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, UK.-P.R.C.
[hereinafter Joint Declaration].
2. Michael Davis, Constitutionalism Under Chinese Rule: Hong Kong after the Handover,
27 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 275, 275 (1999).
3. See generally id; Michael Dardzinski, Hong Kong in Transition: Convergence or
Divergence in the Implementation of the Joint Declaration1 91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L PROC. 176 (1997).
4. Davis, supra note 2, at 276, 283.
5. Hong Kong's Constitution designed to implement the Joint Declaration's guarantees.
People's Republic of China: the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
Peoples' Republic of China, Apr. 4, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1511 [hereinafter Basic Law]. One provision
states: "The government of the HKSAR [Hong Kong Special Administrative Region] shall provide
an appropriate economic and legal environment for the maintenance of the status of Hong Kong
as an international financial center." Id. art. 109. Another provision states: "The government
of the HKSAR shall, on its own, formulate monetary and financial policies, safeguard the free
operation of financial business and financial markets and regulate and supervise them in accordance
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although China's legacy of isolationism has been a formidable obstacle to
reform, one should not diminish the political, economic, and social results of
globalization that have altered China within the last thirty years and continue
to evolve a nation enveloped in an increasingly boundless global community.
This Note asserts that based on historical evidence and China's advancing role
as a global actor, Hong Kong's autonomy depends on the effectiveness of
transnational influences to facilitate Chinese reform and thereby realize Hong
Kong's liberal constitutional autonomy. It considers the past and potential
effects of global functions on Hong Kong and China, and it considers how
these factors may encourage change in both "systems." Although it is yet to
be seen how significant global forces will be in implementing a liberal
movement, they do remain a constant threat to communist party leaders whose
ideology of self-reliance is weakened by the economic necessity to attain
global economic integration.
One global process that is transforming China's recent policies is the
country's imperative to increase foreign trade. By enacting the Foreign Trade
Law of 1994 (FTL), China compromised its trade policy (i.e., drastically
reducing tariff barriers and administrative procedures) to mirror international
trading standards for eventual accession into the World Trade Organization
(WTO).6 China has also been seeking a "phasing-in" process to gain WTO
admission that would gradually eliminate tariff barriers, nontariff barriers,
subsidies for state entities, and provide equal foreign market competition and
compliance with other WTO regulations.7 Access into the WTO could double
China's external trade to 600 billion U.S. dollars per year. Also, associated
gains in productivity could enhance China's Gross Domestic Product growth
by one-half percentage point.' In addition, China has also increased foreign
investment and privatization of businesses, as demonstrated by the substantial
contribution ofjoint ventures and private industrial firms to China's gross value
of industrial output.'
with law." Id. art. 110.
6. See Thomas Yunlong Man, National Legal Restructuring in Accordance with International
Norms: GATT/WTO and China's Foreign Trade Reform, 4 IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 471, 482
(1997).
7. David Blumental, "Reform" of "Opening"? Reform of China's State-Owned Enterprises
and WTO Accession-The Dilemma of Applying GAT to Marketizing Economies, 16 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 198, 206 (1998).
8. Cox Report Business Impact (CNN television broadcast, May 31, 1999).
9. By 1992, the gross value of industrial output by state in the People's Republic of China
was less than fifty percent. SAMANTHA FAY RAVICH, MARKETIZATION AND PROSPERITY:
PATHWAYS TO EAST ASIAN DEMOCRACY 247-50 (RAND Graduate Sch. ed., 1996).
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A certain consequence from the increasing exposure to foreign markets
and privatization, especially if China gains WTO admission with a short
phasing-in process, is the industrialization ofChina as readily seen in its coastal
regions. 0 An unintended, but highly likely result will continue to be the
transnational influence of socially liberal and free-market ideals, that is often
inseparable from industrialization reform, evinced by the urbanization of
Dongguan, a southeastern Chinese province. I Consequently, reform-minded
party leaders, who have used the financial success of reform in the past to
enact the Open Door Policy of 1978 and other liberal policies, 2 will have the
political backing to continue their efforts. In fact, China continues to
modernize its interior by introducing technological industries to parallel the
economic growth in the coastal regions, thereby increasing industrialization. 3
Although China insists that Basic Law guarantees will be upheld under
Chinese socialist rule, Beijing has already favored Hong Kong's business
elite's interests to the peril of individual and democratic rights.' 4 However, if
China becomes more progressive (which seems plausible under the leadership
of Zhu Rongi and other reform party members), Hong Kong's demands for
adherence to Basic Law guarantees, such as the rule of law and freedom of
expression, are more likely to be valued as tools to maintain political stability
and gain foreign confidence in the region. Chinese reformists open to foreign
business procedures, tactics, and expectations understand the concerns of
foreign investors, who believe that non-favoritism to State entities, independent
judicial review and the free flow of information must be present when
conducting business in Hong Kong.' 5
Another potential vehicle of reform is the globalized nature of the island
itself. Great Britain's laissez-faire governance of Hong Kong has made the
region the premiere international and financial center on the Asian mainland,
thereby sensitizing Hong Kong to global processes, 6 which have infiltrated
Chinese borders. As China's gateway to the modem world, Hong Kong was
10. George Chu-Sheng Lin, Intrusion of Global Forces and Transformation of a Local Chinese
Economy: the Experience of Dongguan, in NEW GEOGRAPHIES OF THE PACIFIC RIM: ASIA PACIFIC
250,252-59 (R.F. Watters & T.G. McGee eds., 1997).
11. Id. at 260-63.
12. Deng Xiapong, a reformist party leader, was instrumental in implementing economic
reform during the 1970s and 1980s. See generally RAVICH, supra note 9, at 226, 252-53.
13. Id. at 273.
14. Davis, supra note 2, at 283.
15. See generally RAVICHsupra note 9; see also Davis, supra note 2, at 305-08.
16. PHILIP BOWRING, HONG KONG UNDER CHINESE RULE 8-10 (Warren 1. Cohen & Li Zhao
eds., 1997).
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and still remains China's middleman for trade and investment dealings with the
West, thereby thwarting isolation purists.17 Also, China's observance of the
region's success has prompted Chinese leaders to restructure China's
economic institutions by adopting characteristics of Hong Kong's economic
paradigm. 8
Additionally, Hong Kong's unique internationalized culture, unlike no other
Newly Industrialized Country, is "globalized" due to the high residence of
multinational corporations, foreign banks, investors, foreign fund management
enterprises, and professionals. 9 Also, the majority of Hong Kong's citizens
are not indigenous, they are transitional citizens and are frequently traveling
abroad, further contributing to its internationalized culture.2" The Hong
Kongese have enjoyed several components of Western society, such as
democratic elections, freedom of debate, free press, and other rights during the
Patten reform movement, which occurred just prior to the Chinese reversionI
As a result, many Hong Kong citizens do not view Basic Law guarantees as
abstractions, but rather as concrete rights.2 Thus, the international heritage
of Hong Kong's people, their expectations for democracy, and the region's
foreign-based economy may prove contentious for China.
However, it is yet to be seen whether these globalized forces emerging
from different points of the spectrum can nurture a receptive China to realize
Hong Kong's Basic Law provisions and its democratic components. Also
speculative is whether these forces will cause Beijing to acquiesce to the
liberal reform movement in the PRC. However, due to a variety of factors
such as the Asian globalization of markets, China's new trade regime,
imperatives tojoin the WTO, Hong Kong's link to the international community,
and other "openings" to East Asia, there is an ongoing conversation of reform.
Thus, globalization processes are significant and necessary to analyze in
evaluating the future of law in this one- country, two-systems paradigm.
17. See generally id.; Lynn T. White III, Chinese Globalism in Hong Kong in HONG KONG'S
REUNION WITH CHINA: THE GLOBAL DIMENSIIONS (Gerad Postiglione & James T.H.Tang eds.,
1997) [hereinafter HONG KONG'S REUNION WITH CHINA].
18. Anna M. Han, Hong Kong's Economy Under Chinese Rule: Prosperity and Stability?, 22
S. ILL. U. L.J. 325 (1998).
19. BOWRING, supra note 16, at 24-26.
20. Janet Salaff & Wong Siu-Iun, Globalization of Hong Kong's People: International
Migration and the Family, in HONG KONG'S REUNION WITH CHINA, supra note 17, at 200, 200-
03.
21. Frank Ching, Hong Kong and China: 'One Country, Two Systems'?, HEADLINE SERIES,
June 1996, at 32-36. See generally Byron S.J. Weng, Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong
as International Actors, in HONG KONG'S REUNION WITH CHINA, supra note 17, at 59-60.
22. See generally Ching, supra note 21; Weng, supra note 21.
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To clarify, globalization as referred to in this Note is the international "flow
of various goods-capital, culture, ideas, media, goods, services and even
people" that shape and influence a nation-State's political, economic, and legal
institutions. 3 Hence, instead of deliberate and active governance, a nation-
State must "react" to these international flows that are beyond the sovereign's
control, but leave the sovereign as the ultimate decisionmaker. I adopt one of
many definitions of globalization, which is only intended to provide the scope
that this Note will cover. Viewing globalization as a process that
denationalizes China, while leaving the nation as the ultimate acceptor or
rejecter of these norms, is an accurate chronicle of China's history, and will
probably continue in light of its closed, authoritarian regime.
It is important to understand that globalization processes are not unilateral
exchanges, nor is there a "fixed historical destination." 4 Rather, as held by
transformationalists, "there is no a priori reason to assume that globalization
must simply evolve in a single direction or that it can only be understood in
relation to a single ideal condition [i.e., Western democracy] ... [it is] of a
more contingent and open-ended historical process which does not fit with
orthodox linear models of social change. '25 In this context, the result of
globalization processes reaching East Asia is indeterminate. Instead, these
processes are subject to a series of exchanges with Asian-held values, culture,
politics, government, people, concepts, etc., in an ever-changing dialogue, the
result of which is unknown.26 Evidence of a new species of norms that have
evolved from this transnational dialogue is "low-intensity democracy," 27 a
concept that will be discussed later in this Note.
Thus, perhaps we should maintain a resistance to the idea that global
processes successfully pervading China and Hong Kong will exact a replica
of Western democracy, "liberal constitutionalism," and/or capitalism?' Despite
the Basic Law mirroring Canada's Bill of rights,29 it cannot be overlooked that
23. Dean Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Course Materials for Globalization and the Law (1999)
(unpublished course materials, on file with Dean Alfred C. Aman, Jr., at Indiana University School
of Law-Bloomington).
24. David Held, Democracy, the Nation-State and the Global System, POLITICAL THEORY
TODAY, 1991, at 197.
25. Id.
26. See Aman, supra note 23.
27. Susan Marks, Guarding the Gates with Two Faces: International Law and Political
Reconstruction, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 457, 464 (1999).
28. Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative
Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999).
29. See id.
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Asian-held values, such as the collective good, nonindividualism, and
governmental flexibility in adhering to established law, may alter the application
of these "guarantees."
This Note argues that for Hong Kong to sustain its economic prosperity,
the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law must be the ultimate governmental
determinant. Although it may be asserted that creating a dictatorship rule in
Hong Kong might not prevent continued industrialization and economic growth,
this Note espouses that Hong Kong's foreign service-based economy requires
full democratic governance and a market economy to maintain political stability
and foreign confidence.
To effectuate Hong Kong's goal for a liberal constitutional government,
one can consider the past and future transnational influences that may both
guide and hinder the region's independence. Part I explores the role of
globalization in reforming China and the potential consequences to Hong
Kong's liberal governance. It discusses how global processes influenced
China's economic global integration and how international norms, originating
from the WTO, have rapidly advanced China's domestic and foreign economic
reform. It also examines the often overlooked global effects on the Chinese
population, which may prove to be an impetus for political and cultural change
in Hong Kong and China, especially in light of China's increased foreign
exposure resulting from economic globalization.
Part IIA examines Hong Kong's intense participation in the globalization
of markets and its necessary link to liberal constitutionalism. It addresses the
current status ofHong Kong's government, which has become a form of"low
intensity democracy"3 to the detriment ofHong Kong's international growth.
Part IIB discusses the globalization of Hong Kong's people based on their
migratory past and their previous British colonial rule. Finally, this Note
analyzes the internationalization of Hong Kong's media and its role in
maintaining Hong Kong's autonomy.
I. GLOBAL FUNCTIONS PROCESSING REFORMATION IN CHINA
Although China's economic openness initially arose from the central
government's inability to function under Mao's ideology of"self-sufficiency,'8 '
its emergence in the international community exemplified how a communist
government must react to the "Pandora's box" effect of its Open Door Policy.
30. Marks, supra note 27, at 464.
3 1. RAvicH, supra note 9, at 229.
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Often overlooked are the liberalized perspectives gained by the reform
movement fueled by both economic depression and global functioning.
The beginnings of a Cultural Transformation away from complete
governmental control can be traced back to the Agricultural reforms of the late
1970s, which led to the birth ofprivatization a2 Prior to that time, the majority
of Chinese lived in communes under Mao's philosophy of "self-reliance" or
consuming one's own product. 3 However, after years of inefficient state
domination over farming production and commerce, a reform was needed to
prevent dissension among the peasant masses.34 Hence, private land plots
were created allowing peasants to receive some profits from their endeavors,
rather than having to farm for the commune's mass consumption.35
Marketization ensued when private markets were legitimized in the rural areas
and the cities. 36 By 1984, rural reform culminated in the dissolution of
communes to promote agricultural efficiency. 3
This increase in personal economic freedom gained by privatization gave
rise to individualism and diminished the populace's faith in a sole authoritarian
government. Most importantly, it taught peasants an invaluable lesson that
through their dissidence and fear of political unrest, they lessened State control
and effectuated changes for their own gain.3 As a result, a democratic
movement arose, known as the Democracy Wall Movement, which burgeoned
the Tiananmen Square protests a decade later.39
Other reforms toward privatization of State industries and the introduction
of market mechanisms began to boom in the 1980s, which further diminished
the power of the central government.40 Engaged by the State mainly to
answer the masses' criticism ofa pure command economy, China's economic
development showed signs ofan increased business-oriented and individualistic
political landscape.4
Simultaneous with the shifting ideology toward increased capitalism, the
Chinese were exposed to a wave of foreign influences that amassed from its
32. Id. at 227-31.
33. Id. at 230.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 231.
37. Id. at 236.
38. Id. at 232-34.
39. Id. at 233.
40. Id. at 239-42.
41. Id.
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official 1978 Open Door Policy.42 One great contribution to the increased
marketization and globalization of China's economy resulted from joint
ventures. Joint ventures served as a business-learning device "on the
individual, firm and state levels. 43 Those involved in foreign joint ventures
were learning capitalist mechanisms from their Western counterparts: 4 They
also inadvertently learned the customs, mores, and the culture of freedom they
possessed.45 Chinese businessmen's interactions with the West, while abroad,
taught them freedom firsthand.46
In the business arena, the Chinese were learning to position for a more
equitable stance in State-business relations.47 Western partners were
demanding tax incentives and property protections, catalyzing Chinese partners
to impose their own set of demands.48 Also, special interest organizations,
formed for this business elite, backed reformist party leaders who pushed for
expanding joint venture relationships. 49
Eventually, a growing and powerful political movement created by the
business elite with the economic clout of its international business relations
emerged.50 Through these special interest groups, the business elite gained
representation and control over China's economic policies and regulations,5
which further propelled China's movement toward an open-world economy.
Represented by reformist party members, the business sector has helped
generate reform of China's economic and legal institutions similar to structures
and regulations implemented by the WTO 2
Although a far cry from unfettered democracy, a discrete but recognizable
form of democratic operation had occurred. Nevertheless, considering the
Communist Party's announced intent for public ownership to be the "mainstay
of the economy, 53 rapid growth toward privatization and a free-market
economy is improbable. Most enterprises are still State- owned. 4 However,
despite the certainty of China remaining immune to democracy and
42. See id. at 225.
43. Id. at 247.
44. Id. at 247-48.
45. Id.
46. Id.




51. See generally id.
52. See Man, supra note 6, at 471,493.
53. Blumental, supra note 7, 222.
54. See Han, supra note 18.
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privatization under the current regime, one should not discount the long-range
consequences that current international norms and the resulting reformist
movement may have in displacing its socialist economy within the next forty
to fifty years, especially if China continues to seek global economic integration.
For empirical evidence of the transnational effects on a socialist China, a
nation that has had to struggle with its people's desire for privatization and
democratic reform, one must observe the intrusion of global forces that have
invaded Dongguan."s Due to its close proximity to Hong Kong and the blood
relations that cross each region's borders, Dongguan has been able to form
profitable relationships with Hong Kong. Realizing the advantages of
combining its cheap labor, land, and facilities with the capital flowing from
Hong Kong, Dongguan has flourished because of its export processing industry
specializing in textile, apparel, toys, and electronics.,6 Results of this
manufacturing invasion include increased accelerated growth of the local
economy and a substantial rise in personal income for the general population."
In addition, large factories that are more efficient than the smaller, scattered
factories they replaced have transformed Dongguan into an industrial zone
from its previous agricultural landscape." A less superficial change has been
the attitude ofthe Chinese laborers 9 Unlike State-owned enterprises, working
a factory job is no longer considered as "fulfilling the glorious socialist
obligation of 'serving the people' but as a way of earning a living for personal
gain."" Job security and rewards depend on productivity, efficiency, and
quality of work. Thus, personal ambition and working behavior have been
noticeably altered.6
Social influences have also overtaken Dongguan. Hong Kong visitors
have provided television and radios to the local peasants, thus allowing the
locals access to information from the international spectrum.62 Specifically,
instead of being entertained with the People's Daily, local peasants
increasingly watch 60 Minutes, 20/20, and foreign news broadcasts.63 They
have also been consuming Hong Kong products, from Nike sneakers to
Marlboro cigarettes, and are being exposed to Hong Kong's culture of video
55. See Chu-Sheng Lin, supra note 10, at 250.
56. Id. at 255.
57. Id. at 257.
58. Id. at 259.
59. Id. at 260.
60. Id at 260-61.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 261.
63. Id.
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games, action and horror movies, and Hong Kong pop songs." In addition,
those in Dongguan and other provinces on the coast are exposed to foreign
politics. The Chinese coastal masses are fascinated with the fairly recent
events of Taiwan's first democratically-elected president, and other
democratic reforms arriving in Taiwan and Korea. 5
It is a safe proposition that with China's increased urbanization due to
efforts toward global integration, the Communist ideology of the past may be
replaced with a more "individualistic, incentive-driven society" from increased
exposure to foreign cultures." China's often one-sided foreign trade policy
and the communist faction's resistance toward privatization has prevented
China's interior from developing similarly as on China's coast. However, with
China seeking accession into the WTO, Maoism may be an increasingly dying
ideology, and foreign trade, capital, and accessibility into China may implement
change.
The same cultural and economic reform to China's interior, as in
Donguann, will at a minimum be an antagonistic presence to China's socialist
preservation. At most, China's slow privatization will foster the reform
movement toward a laissez-faire economy and political liberalization within this
next century. Hong Kong's fate depends on China's acquiescence to or
rejection of these social consequences, which often are inseparable from
economic globalization, as seen in China's coastal regions. The next
battleground is the potential unyielding reform created by China's desire to
enter the WTO.
China has been vying for greater power in the international economy by
seeking accession into the WTO.67 Based on its goals to contract in
multilateral trading agreements, to attain Most Favored Nation (MFN) status
with Member Nations, and to gain other trading advantages, China has found
it necessary to emulate the legal and economic systems formulated by the
WTO, which were developed by leading industrialized countries.68
Consequently, China enacted the Foreign Trade Law of 1994 and other trade
regulations mirrored after the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GAIT)/WTO, to conform to international standards for its eventual WTO
accession. 69 This has led to an impetus of domestic legal and economic
64. Id. at 262.
65. RAVICH, supra note 9, at 270.
66. id. at 226, 247-49.
67. Man, supra note 6, at 475-76.
68. Id
69. Id.
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reform, which has provided political leverage to reformers in the PRC.' ° On
the economic scale, China has implemented reform efforts to gradually phase
out discriminatory trade practices that GATT members find unacceptable.7 '
Because the government historically traded for the procurement of necessary
merchandise and foreign currency, it would employ trade policies solely to
further China's interest without regard to its unequal treatment.7 By
manipulating the rate of tariff, currency-exchange rate and import-export
quotas, and licenses, China would discriminate against foreign trading entities
in favor of domestic enterprises." However, China's government, and
particularly the reformist members of the Communist Party, seeks to
restructure its foreign and domestic institutions, and have adopted the
underlying premise that China is transforming into a "socialist market
economy. 74  This essentially means recognizing the State's macro-
management role in State enterprises as merely enforcing established
regulations, rather than participating in daily management activities or
exercising "micro-management control."7 Another goal is to permit
enterprises to retain their profits for continued operation rather than handing
them over to the State, thereby giving business managers an incentive to
"increase efficiency and competitiveness;" and to eliminate State agencies'
discretion in assessing tax rates by applying a uniform fifty-five percent tax on
profits for larger State owned enterprises (SOEs). 6
Other reform efforts delineated in the FTL include promises for the
following: (1) reduced tariffs; (2) reduced foreign trade planning, which sets
mandatory import-export quotas; (3) published rules and administrative
guidelines for foreign trade partners (transparency); (4) principles of
reciprocity77 and MFN status in international agreements; and (5) eventual
conformance to GATT principles in free-market access and elimination of
subsidies to SOEs to allow fair competition.78
70. Blumental, supra note 7, at 201.
71. Man, supra note 6. at 477.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 479.
75. Id. at 480.
76. Blumental, supra note 7, at 229-30.
77. Reciprocity is a nondiscriminatory principle, which requires WTO members that
participate in bi-lateral or multi-lateral negotiations to benefit from the same contractual terms that
are provided to any other member in the same negotiations. Man, supra note 6, at 476-77.
78. Id. at 476-80.
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To realize these reform efforts, inefficient and bureaucratic SOEs, which
comprise over one-third of the nation's gross domestic product, must be
restructured to prevent their insolvency, high unemployment, and political
instability.7 9 Otherwise elimination of subsidies, equal competition between
domestic and foreign entities, and other GATT requirements will create a
massive domestic financial crisis.8" Nevertheless, reformist leaders, who are
anxious to further globalize China's market through both domestic and foreign
economic reform, seek an extremely short "phasing-in" process of compliance
with WTO requirements."'
Whether WTO members will allow a phasing-in process and not require
immediate Chinese compliance in eliminating nontariffbarriers, subsidies, and
other WTO requirements remains uncertain. However, evident from China's
changing economic policies, there is a likelihood ofthe continued restructuring
of China toward a market-oriented economy, which may eventually lead to
accession.82
As the PRC continues integrating into the global economy, a heightened
awareness of modern economic, legal, and political mechanisms is likely to
increase China's adherence of Hong Kong's Basic Law guarantees. Global
forces from the West and the economic incentives they offer pervade the
PRC, and are intertwined with the mores and expectations of individualism and
competition, rather than the collective good and conformity. However, as
globalization is not a unilateral exchange, one cannot discount China's ability
in compromising WTO requirements, which would strengthen socialist
legitimacy. 3 Thus, Hong Kong's role of enhancing global effects within China
may prove decisive in maintaining its autonomy.
II. HONG KONG'S ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND ITS FUNDAMENTAL
LINK TO LIBERALISM
The globalization ofmarkets, meaning the interconnectedness and fluidity
of financial international exchanges, has been exponentially increased in
service-based economies such as Hong Kong." Unlike other Asian Newly
79. Blumental, supra note 7, 210-13.
80. Id.
81. Eager for WTO admission, Premier Zhu Rongi intends to "overhaul SOEs, revamp the
banking center and slash the bureaucracy by half-all within three years." Id. at 254.
82. See generally id. at 216.
83. See generally id. at 247.
84. Anthony Neoh, Financial Legal Institutions in Hong Kong's Transition, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L
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Industrialized Countries (NICs) that depend heavily on export-oriented
industrialization, 5 Hong Kong is entrenched in the global financial system. 6
To sustain Hong Kong's competitive edge in the international market,
adherence to market forces, constitutionalism, and democracy must be
ascertained.
Although, some may argue that other NICs, such as Singapore, South
Korea, and other "little tigers," have rapidly developed under dictatorship rule,
there is resounding evidence to believe that such NIC models would be
disastrous for Hong Kong. 7 Because Hong Kong's economy thrives on
overwhelming service to foreign multinational corporations, foreign banks, and
other entities, the region requires a stable political and legal framework for
foreign operation." Such operation requires: (1) non-preferential treatment
in business regulation enforcement to Chinese entities; (2) a non-corrupt civil
service; (3) independent judicial review of legislation inconsistent with the
Basic law, such as business regulations; (4) the rule of law (i.e., decision-
making powers of the government are restrained by known rules and norms); 9
(5) free flow of information, including public discourse of issues affecting the
region; and (6) other stabilizing legalities guaranteed to foreigners.9"
Furthermore, guarantees designed more for the local populace, including
direct democratic elections with multi-party components, human rights, and
freedom of expression, lends legitimacy to Hong Kong's government, the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), in the eyes of the global
community, and encourages investor confidence of prolonged stability in the
region.9 Such guarantees also prevent political unrest among the Hong
Kongese who have been vocal in their demands for constitutional adherence,
and who are accustomed to their social, political, and economic freedoms after
experiencing the Patten reform movement.92 Without such guarantees,
instability will inevitably create a strong deterrent to foreign entities residing in
the region.
ECON. L. 31, 33-34 (1997); Davis, supra note 2, at 301.
85. BOWRING, supra note 16, at 24.
86. Neoh, supra note 84.
87. Davis, supra note 2, at 301.
88. See Neoh, supra note 84, at 37.
89. Bruce Markell, A View From the Field Some Observations on the Effect of International
Commercial Law Reform Efforts on the Rule of Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 497, 497
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A. Hong Kong's "Thick" Status in Market Globalization
Hong Kong is immersed in the ever-increasing interconnectedness of
global markets. The Hong Kong foreign exchange market is the fifth largest
market in the world, averaging ninety-one billion U.S. dollars on a daily basis?3
The Hong Kong Stock Exchange is the eighth largest in the world, with almost
sixty percent of listed companies being foreign domiciled companies.94 The
region surpasses its Asian competitors in offshore lending, regional corporate
finance, and the amount of multinational corporations, foreign banks, and other
foreign institutions that operate on the isle.95 It also excels in Asia as the
leader in fund management of foreign businessl Approximately eighty billion
U.S. dollars are managed by the island, coupled with an extensive amount of
American and British institutions that use Hong Kong-based international
brokers to conduct regional securities tradings.97
As a result of its competitiveness in the global market, Hong Kong has
applied internationally recognized standards and "regulatory linkages" with
other foreign financial institutions to attract global capital investment.9" In
banking, Hong Kong was one of the first Asian markets to announce
application of the Basle Market Capital Rules." Insecurities, Hong Kong has
adopted common international practices such as establishing a central clearing
system, automated trading systems in stocks and future exchanges, a central
depository for shares, and other practices to provide a liquid, efficient, and
transparent market for foreign investors. 0
Hong Kong has been exhaustive in becoming a competitive financial
center acute to foreign investors' and raisers of capital's needs.'' Due to the
dynamic, fast-paced technological evolution designed to attract foreign
investment, only a non-bureaucratic, open economy can be competitive.
Anthony Neoh, Chairman of Hong Kong's Securities and Futures Commission
eloquently states:
93. Neoh, supra note 84, at 33-34.
94. Id.
95. BOWRING, supra note 16, at 24.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 24-25.
98. Neoh, supra note 84, at 35-36.
99. Id. at 34.
100. Id. at 35.
101. Id. at35-38.
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[T]he openness which pervades [Hong Kong] .. . is at the
root of its success. ... It enables us to look at change not as
threats but as opportunities and fills Hong Kong with the air
of dynamism .... This dynamism is the result of a sense of
security where everyone feels that property, life, and
liberty will be protected, that decisions which affect the
commonweal[th] are publicly discussed and criticism of
these decisions . . . may be freely expressed, that public
servants are publicly accountable for their actions and
may be amenable to challenge in the courts where
necessary, [and] that the government is by and large
unobtrusive and efficient ... .02
The region's adoption of international standards, and the resulting
economic reliance on foreign capital, has made Hong Kong a formidable non-
State vehicle for globalization in influencing China's governance of Hong
Kong."°3 Not oblivious to Hong Kong's necessity for an unfettered financial
community, China has designated the majority of political power in the
HKSAR to the conservative business elite and appointed officials intertwined
with Beijing.' ° Through gerrymandering, appointing the Chief Executive, and
constituency voting (i.e., designated voting only for the professional and
business sectors to elect a portion of members to the Legislative Council),
China has preserved a pro-capitalistic, but apolitical, governance of Hong
Kong. 05 As a result, only one-third of the Legislative Council consists of
democratic members. 0 6
Therefore, partially due to international norms and regulations proven to
provide financial competitiveness, international investors' stronghold on the
economy, and the expertise ofHong Kong's conservative business elite, non-
State actors have imprinted in the minds of Chinese hardliners that a market-
oriented economy should comprise the bulk concern for the HKSAR 7 While
China aspires to formulate its economic development to Hong Kong's current
102. Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
103. Davis, supra note 2, at 310.
104. Han, supra note 18.
105. Davis, supra note 2, at 297-98.
106. Id.
107. See generally id.
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model," 8 there is prevailing doubt that China will uphold full democratic rule
and other liberal constitutional aspects. 0 9
China's official admonition to Hong Kong is that it is to be an economic,
not a political, city."10 Its intent to stifle democracy was evident upon the
reversion when a Provisional Legislature composed of pro-China officials
replaced its Legislative Council, which was previously democratically elected.
Additionally, China aggressively opposed previous reform by Governor Patten,
which expanded the number of directly elected seats to two-thirds of the
Legislative Council."'
Beijing's motivation in deviating from the Basic Law's democratic ideology
can be relegated to the fear of creating a "base of subversion" for communist
hostility, which could create political unrest and perhaps even spark the liberal
movement in China."2 Consequently, the HKSAR is now a cosmetic
democratic tool in implementing a "low intensity democracy," which may
satisfy immediate market agendas, but has time-ridden detrimental effects.'
The concept of democratization that has been occurring in Hong Kong is
actually a sophisticated form of "neo-authoritarianism.""14 To preserve a
market-oriented economy, while legitimizing the government by superficially
appeasing the democratic movement, Chinese leaders essentially believe that
the "elected" conservative business elite must institute economic liberalism,
while quietly defeating other political agendas." 5 As explored by Susan
Marks, "[r]edressing inequalities of political and economic power, and
enhancing the accountability of power-holders to those affected by their
decisions, are hardly economic liberalism priorities.""' 6 She continues by
asserting that when "market fundamentalist" doctrines are enforced, an
ambitious democratic agenda is defeated due to the State's limited resources
to invest in and regulate social programs for the mass population. 7
This extension of democratization to Hong Kong will have unique
repercussions on this foreign service-based economy. Foreign confidence in
domestic institutions upholding a neutral civil service, the rule of law,
108. Han, supra note 18.
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110. Davis, supra note 2, at 297.
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independent judicial review, and non-favoritism toward Chinese entities are
vital." 8 While Beijing's primary goal is to profit from foreign exchanges and
investment in Hong Kong, allowing Chinese practices to permeate Hong
Kong's domestic policies will inadvertently negate foreign investment.
One example is the Hong Kong Department of Justice's failure to
prosecute the New China News Agency for violating privacy laws,"19 and the
failure to directly prosecute a pro-China publisher for falsifying circulation
figures. 20 By undermining the systematic application of the rule of law,
foreign entities have a substantiated fear that HKSAR's administrative and
judicial system will be informed covertly by mainland officials to exercise legal
favoritism for Chinese enterprises.
Another sign of favoritism for mainland enterprises was the attempt by
them to be assigned a functional constituency for the 1998 Legislative Council
elections.' Although this attempt was later abandoned, it highlights to foreign
actors a potential intrusion upon free-market practices. 22 However, whether
"low intensity democracy" will thrive may depend upon a countervailing
globalization phenomena unique to Hong Kong-the globalization of its
people. 1
23
B. Globalization of Hong Kong's Society
Much ofHong Kong's original population was created by the political and
economic upheaval of China and colonial Hong Kong's geographic
accessibility for the massive outflow and inflow of migrants. 24 Hong Kong
continues to maintain "multi-stranded connections" with the mainland due to
political and poverty-stricken refugees that overflowed from China's porous
borders. 2 1 Consequently, migrants' and their descendants' values and
attitudes toward China corresponds with their motivation for fleeing the
country. 26 Economic migrants seem to desire reunification with the mainland
due to existing familial ties, while political refugees, whose parents had lost
property and wealth from Communist victory, mistrust a Chinese-controlled
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political system. 27 Thus, many of the wealthy, who have economic and
familial global resources, wish to secure themselves abroad. 128
However, while affluent Hong Kongese seek international refuge from the
Chinese reversion, many citizens, especially the Hong Kong-born generation,
intend to remain in the region. 129 Increasingly, a small grass-roots democratic
movement evolving from the middle and working classes has created an active
civil society, which has been a discrete, but noticeable counter-presence to the
conservative business elite and the enforcement of economic liberalism. 130
Increasingly, there is a pervasive fear of loss of property, freedom, and
corruption by the populace, which has crystallized local backing for Basic Law
preservation.' 3' During the majority of British colonial rule, Hong Kong was
an apolitical territory (i.e., the Governor and Legislative Council seats were
gained through British appointment). 32 Patten's reform movement before the
reversion, which increased direct democratic elections, encouraged political
debate, the rule of law, and free press, fostered an expectation for political and
cultural freedoms. 3 3 Hence, the British influence has fueled a democratic
norm among a society that has been vocal in its dissent of China's pure
government-business alliance and China's hostility toward Basic Law
guarantees. 134
Greatly contributing to the globalization ofHong Kong's people, in addition
to the British influence, is the internationalization of the media, 35 which also
defines a more democratically-minded citizenry. Mass media in Hong Kong
has developed in a market environment, which has created a substantive
"journalistic diet for international news."'' 36 Approximately one-third of
television news broadcasts and one-half of news wires are Western based,
including the Associated Press, United Press International, and Agence
France-Presse. 137
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As China seeks a disjointed approach ofcontinued economic liberalization,
while stalling political change,'38 the regime may also seek to reduce media
freedoms to prevent internationally provocative ideas from reaching the
demanding populace. 39 However, China's failure to realize that foreign
confidence is intricately tied to the continued free flow of information, including
information regarding economic developments, may be fatal. By nationalizing
the media to conform to Chinese interests and curbing negative reporting of
Chinese business entities, foreign investment becomes risky and lessens Hong
Kong's international appeal. 40 Thus, perhaps global economic pressures will
persuade China to retain media internationalization, while simultaneously
opening the. political and cultural gambit of ideals that continue to globalize
Hong Kong's society.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, China's authoritarian regime will determine whether the
outlined economic, political, and cultural global pressures will attribute to Hong
Kong's development. Based on China's economic imperative to join the
international framework for domestic growth, a pervasive tension will continue
to exist between those advocating a free economy and/or democracy, and the
communist leaders' demands for apolitical rule in the region. Hong Kong's
liberal constitutional paradigm has already seen Chinese ideology altering the
legitimacy of its Basic Law framework to an extent. However, with the fall
of communism in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R., one should not
underestimate the power of economic necessity, which can catalyze the role
ofglobalization to maintain Hong Kong's liberal constitutional autonomy and
facilitate Chinese reform. The beginnings of this realization by the PRC is
evident from its application to the WTO and its acceptance that it must
economically integrate to curtail a depressive economy, a seemingly necessary
factor to win in this zero-sum game.
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